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DECLARING A POLICY OF TRUTH:
RECOGNIZING THE WRONGFUL
ADOPTION CLAIM
Imagine for a moment wanting to adopt a child, either because
you cannot have children of your own or For some other reason.' All
you want is to have a child upon whom you can shower your love and
affections. You go to a state agency where you realize, after attending
a number of meetings, that healthy infants are in high demand and
that your chances of adopting one within the next few years are slim.
So you consider adopting a child with a correctable medical problem,
thinking that it might be a little harder emotionally and financially but
that the burden would be well worth the happiness of raising a child.
To your joy, the agency notifies you that a six-year-old girl named
Amy is available for adoption. The social worker responsible for Amy's
placement informs you that Amy's mother was blonde, blue-eyed and
young, and that she liked to cook and wanted to become a nurse. The
social worker also states that Amy had been hospitalized for malnutri-
tion, that she was small for her age and that the agency removed Amy
from foster care because of alleged abuse. Because the social worker
provided you with no other information, you assume that Amy is
otherwise healthy and ultimately adopt her.
Soon after the adoption, it becomes clear that Amy is behind her
developmental level and that her behavior can be very disruptive.
Concerned about Amy, you engage in a thorough search for any
medical records held by the agency before you adopted her. In the
process you come across a report that stales that Amy's birth mother
is actually a committed mental patient and has been diagnosed with
schizophrenia. You also learn that doctors diagnosed Amy as being
mentally retarded before she was five years old. Finally, you discover
that the social worker who placed Amy with you knew these facts but
never disclosed them. You have grown attached to Amy, and want to
help her, but the medical bills and the constant care Amy needs are
more than you can handle. What can you do?
Since 1986, a number of states have recognized that one remedy
in this situation is to allow the adoptive parents to bring suit for the
'This hypothetical is based on the case of Mohr v. Commonwealth, 653 N.E.2d 1104, 1106-09
(Mass. 1995).
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"wrongful adoption" of the child. 2
 The circumstances in which the
adoptive parents can recover under this theory, however, differ vastly
among states. 3
 A number of courts, while recognizing such a claim,
have limited its applicability to specific circumstances.'
This Note will trace the development of the wrongful adoption
action from its inception in 1986 to its recognition by the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1995. In so doing, this Note will
focus on the recent Massachusetts case, Mohr v. Commonwealth, and
argue that the Mohr court correctly decided a number of related issues
in favor of adoptive parents. 5 Part I provides a brief history of adoption
along with an explanation of background cases that have addressed
the wrongful adoption claim' Part 11 argues that other jurisdictions
should follow the Mohrdecision because it appropriately bolsters adop-
tive parents' rights and supports adoption as an institution in society.'
Part III addresses the importance of allowing wrongful adoption claims
based in negligence! Part IV discusses how imposing a duty to disclose
upon adoption agencies is an essential part of making wrongful adop-
tion claims an effective means of recovery for adoptive parents.' Part
V examines the Mohr court's determination of when a statute of limi-
tations bars a wrongful adoption claim, and argues that courts in other
jurisdictions should similarly decide this issue.m Finally, Part VI consid-
ers the effects of recognizing the wrongful adoption claim upon inter-
mediaries and children, concluding that allowing wrongful adoption
claims ultimately serves all parties' best interests."
2 E.g., Mohr, 653 N.E.2d at 1112; see	 &	 v. Caritas Family Servs., 488 N.lAr.2d 282,
288 (Minn. 1992); Burr v. Board of County Commis, 491 N.E.2d 1101, 11(17 (Ohio 1986).
3 Compare Mohr, 657 N.E.2d at 1112 & n.10 (allowing recovery for intentional and negligent
misrepresentations and requiring a duty to disclose) with Mallette v. Children's Friend & Serv.,
601 A.2d 67, 72-77 (R.I. 1995) (allowing recovery for negligent misrepresentation but not
requiring a duty to disclose) and Burr, 491 N.E.2d at 1109 (allowing recovery for intentional
misrepresentations only).
'I See, e.g., Michael J. v. County of L.A. Delft of Adoptions, 247 Cal. Rpm. 504, 513 (CI. App.
1988); Burr, 491 N.E.2d at 1109; Meracle v. Children's Servs. Soc'y, 437 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Wis.
1989).
5 See infra notes 258-720 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 12-257 and accompanying text
7 See infra notes 258-88 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 289-307 and accompanying text.
• See infra notes 308-20 and accompanying text.
I° See infra notes 321-29 and accompanying text.
II See infra notes 370-84 and accompanying text.
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I. TRACING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WRONGFUL ADOPTION CLAIM
A. The History of AdOtion
Although the first adoption statutes in the United States were not
passed until the mid-nineteenth century,' 2 there was little controversy
over the passage of these laws because the idea of adoption had existed
for centuriesP The enactment of these laws was merely considered a
natural step in the movement towards a more formal recognition and
further development of the adoption process." Although the passage
of these adoption laws was not one of the great issues of that time,
these laws were, nonetheless, critical in bringing the force and struc-
ture of the judicial system into the private affairs of the family.' 5 The
first American adoption statutes legalized relationships that would
otherwise exist, as they had for years, solely in the form of simple
informal agreements between persons.'"
These early adoption statutes further provided, in varying degrees,
for judicial supervision over adoptions." Courts became more involved
in the adoption process, replacing the American tradition of informal
transfer of parental rights. 18
 Since then, whenever there were any
contests between the natural and custodial parents, for example, when
the natural parents wanted their child back, the courts would have the
authority to step in via a habeas corpus action. 19 Because a habeas
12 HELEN I.. WITMER Fr AL., INDEPENDENT ADOPTII /NS 19 (1963). Texas and Vermont were
the first states to enact adoption laws in 1850. M. at 30. In 1851, Massachusetts enacted i IS first
adoption statute. M.
13 Mary E. Schwari2, Note, Fraud in the Nursery: Is the Wrongful Adoption Remedy Enough?,
26 VAL. U. L. Rev. 807. 810 (1992). In fact, adoptions can be found in Greek mythology and in
a number of Biblical stories. See id. at 810 n.19.
14 See WITMER, Stipa] nom 12, at 19.
15 See id.; Joan H. Hollinger, Introduction to Adoption Law and Practice, in 1 AinurrioN LAW
AND PRACTICE § 1.02, at 22 (Joan H. Hollinger ed., 1968)1 Schwartz, supra note 13, at 811.
/6 WITMER, .521/i7r1 DOW 12, at 24.
17 Id. at 30-31.
18 Schwartz, supra Iliac I 3, at 811 & n.30. This tradition ()I informal adoptions developed in
part from the Puritan practice of "putting out," or sending children to live with families who
could afford to raise them. Id. at 811 n.30. The informal transfer of parental rights was also
prevalent in the South in the 1700s, where wealthy citizens often took large groups of orphans
into their families. Id.
WITMER„cupra note 12, at 25. Habeas corpus means, in Latin, "yell have the body." Bt.Acx's
LAW DICTIONARY 709 (6th ed. 1990). Although habeas corpus actions are usually brought by
persons seeking release from unlawful imprisonment, in these custody battles between custodial
and natural parents, habeas corpus was dm usual Nom in which the dispute was presented to the
courts. Wrrxmit, supra note 12, at 25; see. BLACK'S LAW DrcrIoNARY 709.
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corpus proceeding was a flexible remedy akin to an action in equity,
courts could mold their judgments to fit the needs of the parties before
them." Thus, courts played an increasingly vital role in formalizing
adoptions and in mediating disputes that arose out of adoptions and
other informal custodial arrangements. 21
The first American adoption statutes fell into two broad catego-
ries: those that authenticated and made a public record of private
agreements of adoption and those that provided for judicial supervi-
sion over the adoption process. 22
 These statutes also shared two distinct
characteristics with Roman adoption law, the basis for American adop-
tion statutes." The first characteristic was the requirement of a com-
plete severance of the adoptee from the biological family coupled with
a complete acceptance into the adoptive family. 24
 The second charac-
teristic was the recognition of adoptive parents' rights as superior to
those of either adoptees or biological parents. 25 Generally, both of
these characteristics were intended to ensure that the adoptee became
a full-fledged member of the new family and that the adoptive parents'
family lines survived.26
Initially, the adoption process matched children with parents based
on superficial characteristics such as hair and eye color. 27 In the 1850s,
Charles Loring Brace, a Protestant minister, spearheaded the "orphan
train" movement to place selected children." Brace believed that send-
ing homeless children out to midwestern farms would reform these
"little vagabonds."'" Adoptive parents' qualifications and their plans for
the children were never questioned. 30 As a result of this movement,
from 1853 to as late as 1929, children were shipped from the East Coast
to the Midwest for adoption where they were displayed on platforms
and selected by families. 3 ' The children were never formally adopted,
and the families with whom they lived had no legal responsibility to
2" WITMER, supra note 12, at 25.
21 See id. at 24-25, 28.
22 /c./. at 30-31; Schwartz, supra note 13, at 811-12.
2 ,Schwartz, supra note 13, at 811; see Leo H. Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and
Modern, 9 VAND. L. REv. 743, 747 (1956).
24 Hoard, supra note 23, at 744; Schwartz, supra note 13, at 811.
25 Schwartz, supra note 13, at 811; see Huard, supra note 23, at 745.
26 Schwartz, supra note 13, at 811.
27 1d. at 812.
23 See Janet Hopkins Dickson, Comment, The Emerging Rights of Adoptive Parents: Substance
or Specter?, 38 UCLA L. REv. 921, 923 (1991).
29 See id. at 923-24.
3" Id. at 924.
31 Schwartz, supra note 13, at 812 n.33; see Dickson, supra note 28, at 924.
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care for them." 2
 Either an adoptive parent or a child could end their
relationship at will."'
Near the beginning of the twentieth century, however, ensuring
the welfare of adoptees became an important consideration in the
adoption process."' Although a number of state statutes already in-
cluded provisions that permitted adoptions only if the adoption would
promote the welfare of the child, a long-standing public concern in
ensuring that homeless and destitute children were properly cared for
gradually extended to the adoption process." As a result, states began
to recognize the adoptees' needs and pass legislation that took into
account their welfare."
One of the most important developments in adoptees' rights was
the statutory requirement of a social investigation, through which the
suitability of the adoptive home would be determined, prior to formal
adoption:37
 This requirement was essential to the adoption process
because a court supervising the adoption needed full and complete
facts about the child and his or her adopting parents in order to make
proper decisions regarding the child's placement. 38
 Furthermore, be-
cause the adoption process would affect the rest of the adoptee's life,
an acloptee was entitled to the most thorough and careful work in the
adoption process.'" Not surprisingly, by 1954, the adoption laws of
forty-four states contained provisions for social investigations.'" Since
then, states have continued their efforts to devise legal protection for
the adoptee, effectively replacing the interests of the adoptive parents
32 Dickson, supra note 28, at 924.
" Id.
34 See Charles Chejfec, Comment, Disclosure of an Adoplee's HIV Status: A Return to Orphan-
ages and Leper Colonies?, 13 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER Sc. holt L. 343, 351 & n.54 (1995). One
commentator believes that this change developed after mental health theory began to impact
juvenile law, resulting in a policy shift emphasizing that adoption was to serve the interests oldie
child. Schwartz, supra note 13, at 813.
35 WITMER, supra note 12, at 31, 33. Several states required that the adoptive parents be able
to sufficiently care for the adoptive child in their first adoption statutes, including Massachusetts,
Illinois, Maine, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Washington and Wisconsin. Id. at
31
" Id. at 34. For example, in 1917, Minnesota amended f ts adoption statute to provide that
an investigation of proposals for adoption be made by the slate Welfare Department, a licensed
children's agency, a social worker of the court or a similarly competent person. Id. at 35. Other
protection still exists today which help prevent children from being adopted against their interest
or casually removed from their natural homes. Id. at 34.
37 1d. at 34.
38 See id. at 35 (quoting Wisconsin Children's Code Commission report from early 1930s).
59 Id.
49
	 .CUPTa note 12, at 35. Twenty-six states required these investigations while 18 states
left investigations to the discretion of the courts. Id. at 35-36.
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with the welfare of the adoptee as the focal point in the adoption
process.'"
B. Agency Adoptions v. Independent Adoptions
There are two kinds of intermediaries who place children with
adoptive families—agencies and independent facilitators." In an agency
adoption, children are placed with the help of a licensed social service
agency." After the prospective parents contact an adoption agency, the
agency conducts in-depth interviews with them. 44 These interviews both
allow the agency to carefully observe the adoptive parents and also give
adoptive parents a general idea of what the adoption process entails.•
Once the agency approves the prospective parents, their names are
placed on a waiting list of qualified adopters." The final step in the
procedure is a court appearance to finalize the adoption. 47 The court
ensures that the biological parents have given their voluntary, informed
consent to the adoption." Upon such a finding, the court then issues
an adoption decree and a new birth certificate, signifying a new start
to the child's life."
In an independent adoption, an unlicensed third party arranges
the adoption.5" Although the facilitator is usually a lawyer or doctor,
some states also permit direct placements by the biological parents.''
The main purpose of the facilitator is to interview the biological par-
ent(s) to determine the level of commitment to the adoption.52 A
certified social worker or adoption agency performs the study of the
prospective parents." The final step in this type of adoption involves
11 See id. at 36-37. Such efforts have included fbrbidding adoption placements not made by
a natural parent, guardian, relative, or authorized agency, prohibiting all independent placements
except. when made with relatives, and requiring that "whenever a child is placed independently
for adoptive purposes, either the person who places the child or the person who receives the
child must notify the slate welfare department." Id. at 36.
. 12 Schwartz, supra note 13, at 813-14,
IS WILLIAM Mu. .LAN ET AL., AnomoNs Wrrttouir AGENCIES: A STUDY OF iNDEPFNDENT
ADO VTIONS 1 (1978); Schwartz, supra note 13, at 814.
11 Schwartz, supra note 13, at 814.
45 Id.
16 Id. at 814-15.
17 Id, at 815.
4H
19
 Schwartz., supra note 13, at 815-16.
Id. at 813-14. These unlicensed third parties are commonly referred to as facilitators. See
generally MEEZAN, supra note 43 (thoroughly discussing various studies done on independent
adoptions).
1' 1 MEEZAN, Slipnl note 43, at 1,7.
."'4 See Schwartz, supra note 13, at 814.
53 Id.
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the biological mother or father signing the surrender papers and the
adoptive parents petitioning the court for adoption."
Although agencies and facilitators of independent adoptions have
the same goal in mind—placement of a child with a compatible fam-
ily—they differ in how they achieve this goal." 5
 Agencies often provide
additional services to biological mothers such as medical care and
counseling through public assistance," whereas independent adop-
tions provide more substantial financial assistance by compensating
biological mothers for many of their expenses." Agencies also often
follow formal procedures that are essential to the protection of the
child, such as exploring the motivation of the adoptive parents and
their capacity for the parental role." Conversely, individuals who facili-
tate adoptions may not formally undertake such procedures.•
Because agencies and independent facilitators differ in their meth-
ods of placing children, biological and prospective parents may have
different attitudes toward each type of adoption!'" Some biological
parents may perceive agencies as bureaucratic and more impersonal
than an individual doctor or lawyer.''' Hence, biological parents may
view independent adoptions as more confidential and as providing
them with a forum in which they can state their concerns and have
some say in the placement of their child.°
Agency and independent adoptions also differ when it comes to
disclosing specific information about an adoptee's background.° Stud-
ies have shown that while agencies share a good deal of information
about a child's background, including medical and psychiatric history
of biological parents, facilitators may disclose less background infor-
mation to prospective parents."' This disparity in information may
54 id,
55 See MEI:ZAN, StIpra note 43, at 10-11,
56 /d. at 10.
57 Schwartz, supra note 13, at 814 11.42.
" MicriAN, ,supra note 43, at 11.
39 Id.
44) See id. at 10-11.
61
62
 See id. at 11; Schwartz, supra note 13, at 819 11.92.
63 MEEZAN, MIMI note 43, at 6.
61 /d. a19 (citing MARY ANN JONES, THE SEALED ADOPTION RECORD CONTROVERSY: A REPORT
OP Acr,Nev POLICY, PRACTICE AND OPINION (Child Welfare League of America, 1976)). One
reason why agencies nay be more likely to share relevant information is that, clue to their
associatiim with social services departments, they are more likely to have access to it. See Vicroit
E. RANG() it' AL, THE FLOW OF ADOPTION INFORMATION FROM THE STATES 13 (1994). Social
services departments arc great sources of this information because they have ;1 pR ngrammatic
interest in adoption information and, thus, obtain the participation of other agencies, such as
bureaus of vital statistics, who also have access to relevant information. Id.
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occur because biological mothers are reluctant to divulge information
that might harm their child's chances of being adopted or because
facilitators do not recognize the importance of obtaining this informa-
tion.65 Thus, adoptive parents who use an independent facilitator may
receive less information than they might from an agency.`' In either
case, this information is important so that the adoptive parents can
make a fully informed decision about whether or not to adopt, and
can help the child develop his or her identity. 67
C. `fort Liability for Agency Decisions Concerning Foster Care:
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services
Although the United States Supreme Court has not addressed the
issue of whether agencies should be held liable for wrongful adoption,
the Court has considered whether agencies should be held liable
for their placement decisions concerning foster care." In 1989, in
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, the United
States Supreme Court held that the State had no constitutional duty
to protect a child from injuries caused by his biological father while
the child was in his father's custody, even though the State had once
given a third party temporary custody of the child. 69 In DeShaney, the
State Department of Social Services suspected that a child was being
abused by his father but took no action to permanently remove the
child from his father's custody." The child and his mother sued the
State pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 71 They alleged that the State had
effectively deprived the child of his liberty without due process of law,
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, by failing to intervene
when they knew or should have known that his father was abusing
him. 72 The Supreme Court reasoned that because the harm occurred
while the child was in the custody of his father, who was in no sense a
state actor, the State itself did not deprive the child of his liberty."
Thus, the Court held that the State's failure to protect an individual
against private violence does not constitute a violation of the Due
Process Clause. 74
65 MEEZAN, supra note 93, at 6.
''' See id.
67 See id,
614 See DeShancy v, Winnebago County Dept of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 201 (1989).
69 Id. at 192, 201.
7° Id. at 192-93.
71 Id. at 193.
72 Id.
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201.
7-1 Id. at 197.
September 19961	 WRONGFUL ADOPTION	 983
In DeShaney, Joshua's biological father had physically abused him
for a long period of time. 75 The Winnebago County Department of
Social Services ("DSS") first learned that Joshua might be a victim of
child abuse in January 1982, when he was approximately two years
old.76 At that time, his father's second wife complained to police that
the father had hit Joshua, leaving marks. 77 In response, DSS inter-
viewed the father, but did nothing more. 78 In January 1983, Joshua was
admitted to a local hospital with multiple bruises and abrasions. 7" Upon
being notified of Joshua's condition, DSS obtained a court order from
a Wisconsin juvenile court to place Joshua in the temporary custody
of the hospital." Despite this change in custody and the creation of a
"Child Protection Team"' to consider Joshua's situation, the juvenile
court ultimately dismissed the case and DSS returned Joshua to his
father's custody.82 For the next seven months, the caseworker assigned
to Joshua's case observed a number of suspicious injuries on Joshua's
head." She also learned that he had not been enrolled in schoo1. 84 The
caseworker dutifully recorded these incidents, along with her continu-
ing suspicions that someone was physically abusingioshua." Finally, in
March 1984, Joshua's father beat him so severely that he fell into a
life-threatening coma." Joshua survived as a result of emergency brain
surgery but had suffered so much brain damage that he was required
to spend the rest of his life in an institution for the profoundly re-
tarded.87
In deciding that the State could not be held liable for failing to
protect Joshua from his father's abuse, the United States Supreme
Court reasoned that a state simply cannot be held liable when private
citizens act violently." The Court reasoned that a constitutional duty
to provide an individual with certain services arises only when a state
75 See id. at 192-93.
70 1d. at 192.
" Id, at 191-92.
78 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 192.
79 Id.
80 Id .
81 Id. This "team" consisted of a pediatrician, a psychologist, a police detective, a lawyer for
Winnebago County, several DSS caseworkers, and various hospital personnel. Id.
82 Id. At this time, DSS entered into an agreement with Joshua's father to take a few steps
toward improving Joshua's situation, such as enrolling Joshua in a preschool program and having
Joshua's father seek counselling. Id.
83 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 192-93.
84 Id. at 193.
85 Id.
86 1d.
87 Id.
88 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197.
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restrains that person's freedom to the point at which the person is
wholly dependent upon the state. 8" Otherwise, the Court explained, a
state is not a guarantor of an individual's safety, even if it has once
offered that person shelter."°
Although the United States Supreme Court did not hold that a
state has a constitutional duty to protect a child in Joshua's situation,
the Court did note that a state may still acquire a duty under state tort
law to provide such a child with adequate protection."' The Court
stated that a state may, through its courts and legislature, impose such
affirmative duties of care and protection upon its agents."2 Because not
all common-law duties owed by government actors are constitutional-
ized by the Fourteenth Amendment, however, the Court held that the
State's failure to act in this situation did not deprive Joshua of his lib-
erty in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."
D. Case Law: Other States' Treatment of Wrongful Adoption
In 1986, in Burr v. Board of County Commissioners, the Supreme
Court of Ohio became the first court to hold that an adoption agency
can be held liable for wrongful adoption." In Burr, the adoptive par-
ents brought suit against a public adoption agency which represented
to them that it had a "nice big, healthy, baby boy" for the couple to
adopt, even though the agency knew that the child had physical and
mental problems at the time of adoption."' The agency also repre-
89 Id. at 200. An example of a person who is wholly dependent on the state is a prisoner or
an involuntarily committed mental patient. Id.
9I) Id. at 201.
91 Id. at 201-02 (possible duties which may arise in these situations include the duty to render
certain services in a non-negligent fashion and the affirmative duty to act which arises due to a
"special relationship").
92 Id, at 202.
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 191, 202.
94 491 N.E.2d 1101, 1107 (Ohio 1986); Marci J. Blank, Note, Adoption Nightmares Prompt
judicial Recognition of the "fort of Wrongful Adoption: Will New York Follow Suit?, 15 CARDozo L.
Rev. 1687, 1695 (1994) (recognizing Burr as the first successful wrongful adoption case). The
first court to even consider the tort of wrongful adoption was the California Court of Appeals in
1980. See Richard P. v. Vista Del Mar Child Care derv., 165 Cal. Rptr. 370, 373 (Ct. App. 1980).
In this case, the California Court of Appeals held that the adoptive parents' claims of negligent
and intentional misrepresentations sailed because the defendant adoption agency had ray
disclosed all the facts it had on hand to the adoptive parents. Id. The court went on to bar the
adoptive parents' claim as a matter of public policy, reasoning that to impose liability in such a
case would effectively make the adoption agency a guarantor of an adoptee's future health. Id.
at 374.
Burr, 491 N.E.2d at 1105-06.
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stinted that the child's mother was eighteen, unmarried, and simply
could not handle raising the child when, in fact, the mother was a
thirty-one-year-old mental patient at a state mental institution.g°
In order to recoup some of the child's medical expenses, which
amounted to over $80,000, the parents brought suit alleging that but
for their reliance on the agency's material misrepresentations, they
would not have adopted the child." The Supreme Court of Ohio
allowed the wrongful adoption claim, based in fraud, reasoning that
when an infant is deceitfully placed in an adoptive home it would be
a travesty of justice and a distortion of the truth to conclude that the
agency's fraud is not actionable." Noting that couples are able to weigh
the risks of becoming natural parents, taking into consideration a host
of factors, the court concluded that adoptive parents should be allowed
to make the same decision in an informed and intelligent manner.'"
Thus, the court held that as long as all the elements of the tort of fraud
were met, the Burrs would be eligible to recover for wrongful adop-
tion. 11'"
In recognizing a cause of action for wrongful adoption, however,
the Supreme Court of Ohio was careful to expressly limit its holding
to intentional misrepresentations. 1 "I The court was concerned that its
decision would be interpreted as either requiring adoption agencies
to be guarantors of their placements, or evincing a desire to shift the
burden of parenting from parents to society by holding agencies Ii-
able whenever adoptees developed serious emotional or physical prob-
lerns.m2
 The court nonetheless held that the agency's deliberate act of
misinforming the Burrs deprived them of their right to make a sound
parenting decision, and that they therefore suffered compensable in-
juries.'"" Thus, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the record amply
supported the trial court's finding that the agency engaged in fraud
and affirmed the judgment in favor of the adoptive parents in the
amount. of $125,000.'" Most importantly, however, the court recog-
nized a claim of wrongful adoption against adoption agencies for their
intentional misrepresentations to adoptive parents. 305
96 1d. at 1105, 1106 10.
17 /d. at 1106 & n.3, 1108.
" Id. at 1107.
" Id. at 1109.
11)" Burr, 491 N.E.2(1 at 1105.
I" Id. at 1109.
"2
 See id.
103 Id,
104 M. at 1105, 1108.
I"' Burr, 491 N.E.2d at 1105.
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Similarly, two years later, in Michael J. v. County of Los Angeles
Department of Adoptions, the California Court of Appeals held that adop-
tive parents could sue for wrongful adoption for an agency's inten-
tional, but not negligent, misrepresentations regarding their adopted
child's health.m6 In Michael I, a woman adopted a child in 1970 who,
according to the County adoption agency, was "suitable for adoption,
being in good health, except for the port wine stain" on his upper torso
and face that was the color of a deep sunburn.m Based on medical
knowledge and information available in 1970, the County knew or
should have known that the port wine stain was a manifestation of
Sturge-Weber Syndrome.m In fact, when the adoptive mother asked
about the stain, the County concealed its significance from her despite
its knowledge that she was strongly considering adopting the child. 109
The adoptive mother did not learn that the child had Sturge-We-
ber Syndrome until he suffered an epileptic seizure on July 28, 1981. 114
She then sued the County for her emotional distress and for the child's
medical expenses."' The trial court granted the County's motion for
summary judgment finding that public policy did not warrant a depar-
ture from general sovereign immunity in this area of law."' On appeal,
the California Court of Appeals looked to the Supreme Court of Ohio's
decision in Burr for guidance." 3 In determining that public policy does
in fact recognize a cause of action for wrongful adoption against
adoption agencies, the California Court of Appeals also reasoned that
it would be a "travesty of justice and distortion of the truth" if such
deceit by adoption agencies were not actionable "when the tragic but
hidden realities of the child's infirmities finally came to light."'" Like
the Burr court, the California Court of Appeals limited the applicability
of its decision by explicitly refusing to hold agencies liable for "mere
negligence." It stated that it did not want to make agencies the
guarantors of an adoptee's future good health."" Despite this concern,
the California Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment and
106 247 Cal. Rptr. 504, 513 (Ct. App. 1988).
107 Id.
'("' Id.
109 S„
110 m.
111 Michael J.. 247 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
112 See id. at 505 n.1, 506.
" 3 /d.
114 Id. (quoting Burr, 491 N.E.2d at 1109).
115 Id.; see Burr, 491 N.E.2d at 1109.
116 Michael J., 247 Cal. Rptr. at 513; see Burr, 491 N.E.2d at 1109.
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held that public policy would not condone concealment or intentional
misrepresentation which misleads prospective parents. 117
In 1989, in Meracle v. Children's Service Society, the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin became the first court to hold that adoption agencies
could also be held liable for their negligent misrepresentations about
a child's health." 8 In Meracle, the adoptive parents told the Children's
Service Society in 1977 that they wanted a "normal, healthy child."" 9
By this, they meant that they wanted a child who did not have a
disabling or terminal disease, who was not deformed and who was of
average or above average intelligence.' 2° In 1979, the adoptive parents
learned about a child who was available but whose grandmother had
died of Huntington's Disease. 121
 The agency representative explained
to the parents that the child's chances of developing the disease were no
greater than any other child's because the disease is transmitted be-
tween successive generations.' 22
 According to the agency representative,
then, the fact that the child's father had tested negative indicated that
the child was not at particular risk of developing the disease. 123 In 1984,
a neurologist diagnosed the child as having Huntington's Disease and
the adoptive parents brought suit against the agency, alleging that the
child was negligently placed and that the agency negligently misrepre-
sented that the child was free of Huntington's Disease. 124
 The adoptive
parents sought a $10,000,000 judgment for loss of society and compan-
ionship of the child, pain and suffering, lost wages and medical ex-
penses. 125
In its defense, the agency argued that both a three-year statute of
limitations and public policy barred the parents' claim.' 2" In holding
that the statute of limitations did not bar the parents' claim, the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin reasoned that the statute had not begun
to run until 1984, when the child's diagnosis formed the basis for a
117 Michaeif, 247 Cal, Rptr. al 513. In its holding, the court failed to address the question
of whether the adoptive mother had a viable claim for emotional distress. See id.
118 437 N,W.2c1 532,537 (Wis. 1989).
"8 Id. at 533.
120 Id.
121 Id. Huntington's Disease is a progressive or degenerative disorder characterized by irregu-
lar, spasmodic, involuntary movements of the limbs or facial muscles, accompanied by a gradual
loss of mental capacity, ending in dementia. STEnstAN's Mt,: DICAI, DICTIONARY 299 (25th ed,
1990).
122 Merrick, 437 N.W.2d at 533.
122 Id.
124 Id
125 1d. at 533-34.
128 Id. at 534.
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cause of action. 127 Until that time, the court concluded, the parents
were not deprived of any liberty, nor had they suffered any injury,
pecuniary or emotional, which would support a claim against the
age n cy.
The court also held that the parents' claim for wrongful adoption
did not violate public policy, reasoning that the adoptive parents could
be provided a remedy without imposing too onerous a burden on
adoption agencies in the state.' 29 in fact, the court stated that permit-
ting such a cause of action would not inhibit adoptions but would
actually give potential parents more confidence in the adoption proc-
ess and in the accuracy of the information they received.'" The Su-
preme Court of Wisconsin also concluded that the parents' claim was
not barred by public policy because allowing such claims would not
expose adoption agencies to potentially limitless liability, nor would it
make them the guarantors of the health of adopted children."' The
court stated that because it would not impose upon adoption agencies
a duty to discover or disclose information, these agencies could be held
liable only where they made incorrect, affirmative representations about
a child's health."'
This decision, however, was very narrow in that it allowed agencies
to avoid liability by "simply refrain [Mg] from making affirmative rep-
resentations about a child's health."'" The court further narrowed its
holding by emphasizing that adoptive parents could only recover for
extraordinary medical expenses incurred as a result of the negligent
misrepresentation.'" In so doing, the court did not, however, preclude
the possibility of adoptive parents recovering for emotional distress
where they fulfilled the elements of that cause of action.' 3  Most im-
portantly, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin broke new ground by
Metarle, 437 N.W.2d at 536.
125 See id.
125 See id. at 537.
c 111
131 Id,
132 Mehl de, 437 N.W.2d at 537. In other words, adoption agencies have no duty to disclose
relevant infOrmation, but once the agency voluntarily assumed this duty and released some
information, it could not then negligently breach that duty. Id.
i" See id.
Ill See id. The court did not explicitly state what 'extraordinary" medical expenses were, but
this presumably means anything relating to the child's treatment for Huntington's disease. See
id.
135 See id. at 536. In this case, the court held. that the adoptive parents did not have a claim
for emotional distress because they could not demonstrate the existence of any physical injury,
an essential element of that cause of action. Id.
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holding that adoptive parents may bring a claim against agencies for
their negligent misrepresentations regarding an adoptee's health.""
Similarly, in 1992, in M.H. &J.L.H. v. Caritas Family Services, the
Supreme Court of Minnesota held that public policy did not preclude
adoptive parents from bringing a negligent misrepresentation action
against an adoption agency.'" In Caritas, a couple contacted a Catholic
social service agency in 1980 and completed an application for adop-
tion during a home interview in May of that year.mIn November 1981,
the couple was interviewed again for the purpose of exploring the
parents' feelings toward a child with incest in his or her background)"
According to the adoption summary, the prospective parents appeared
open to any child except one with a serious mental deficiency."" Two
days later, the agency informed the couple that the agency had a child
they might wish to adopt but that there was a possibility of incest in
the child's family."' The agency also mentioned that there was a slight
chance of abnormalities related to the possible incest."' The couple
ultimately adopted the child, relying on their belief that incest in the
child's family background would not affect the child's health.""
Throughout his childhood, the child experienced serious behav-
ioral and emotional problems, causing the adoptive parents to investi-
gate the child's genetic background in 1987."4
 At that time, at the
adoptive parents' request, Caritas Family Services provided a docu-
ment stating that the child was the son of a 17-year-old boy and his
13-year-old sister. 145
 Upon learning these facts, the adoptive parents
filed an action against the adoption agency, alleging that the agency
failed to disclose the relationship of the child's genetic parents and all
relevant history known to the agency about the birth parents. 14t' The
complaint also alleged that the adoptive parents had suffered mental
pain and anguish and had incurred considerable expenses as a result
of the agency's misrepresentations." 7
193
 See id.
137
 488 N.W.2d 282, 288 (Minn, 1992).
1 " M. at 284.
139
 Id.
140
HI Id.
142 Caritas, 488 NA/V.2d at 285.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145
 Id.
146 1d at 286.
117 Caritas, 488 N.W.2d at 286,
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The Supreme Court of Minnesota held that public policy did not
preclude the wrongful adoption claim based in negligence, reasoning
that the adoptive parents' compelling need for kill disclosure of medi-
cal background information outweighed the burden placed on adop-
tion agencies to provide this information in a non-negligent manner."s
Such information, the court reasoned, is critical to adoptive parents in
securing timely and appropriate medical care for a child and allows
the adoptive parents to make important personal, health and family
decisions.' 49 The court further reasoned that non-negligent disclosure
is particularly important because adoption agencies are the adoptive
parents' only source of information about a child's medical and ge-
netic background.' 5°
The Caritas court also held that the adoptive parents could not
recover for negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress, or
for punitive damages, because they failed to allege sufficient facts to
support these claims.' 5 ' As in Meracle, however, the Supreme Court of
Minnesota failed to impose an affirmative common law duty upon
adoption agencies to disclose facts about a child's parentage.' 52 The
court did conclude, however, that once an agency undertakes disclo-
sure of such information, it. must do so completely and adequately.'"
Thus, the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that an adoption agency
may be held liable for its negligent misrepresentations about an adop-
tee only where the agency volunteered the relevant information.'"
In 1992, in Roe v. Catholic Charities, the Appellate Court of Illinois
for the Fifth District finally did what earlier courts had failed to do: it
concluded not only that adoption agencies can be sued for negligent
and intentional misrepresentations, but also that these agencies have
a duty to disclose all available information about an adoptee in re-
sponse to adoptive parents' inquiries. 155 In Catholic Charities, three
t'y See id. at 287, 288.
19 Id. at 287.
1 ."'' Id. at 288.
151 Id. at 290.
152 Caritas, 488 N.W.2d at 287-88; Merrick, 437 N.W.2d at 537.
153 Caritas, 488 N.W.2d at 288. The court based this holding on the longstanding notion that
even if one has no duty to disclose a particular fact, if one chooses to speak he or she must say
enough to prevent the words from misleading the other party. Id. (citing Newell v. Randall, 19
N.W. 972, 973 (Minn. 1884)).
1 " Id.
' 55 588 N.E.2d 354, 365 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). Although this decision came closer to imposing
a duty on adoption agencies to disclose information about a child's background than any previous
decision, it still failed u impose an affirmative duty to disclose this information and thus fell short
of fully protecting the adoptee and her adoptive parents. See id.
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families went to the same adoption agency in hopes of finding physi-
cally and mentally healthy children to adopt. 51 6 The parents stipulated
to the adoption agency that they would only adopt a child if the agency
would tell them all they knew about their prospective child's back-
ground and if they would incur no unusual or extraordinary expense
by adopting the child. 157
 In response, the agency, through its agents
and employees, made statements to the three sets of adoptive parents
that their particular child was healthy and only needed lots of love.' 58
The agency further indicated to each set of parents that each child was
normal in his or her physical and mental condition as well as level of
development, and that the adoptive parents would thus incur no un-
usual or extraordinary medical expenses for the child's care and treat-
ment. 159
Although the agency represented that the children were healthy,
it knew that each of these children had serious behavioral problems,
ranging from one child smearing feces on the interior walls of past
foster homes to another child stomping to death a family dog at a foster
home.' 6° Two of these children had received extensive counseling and
were diagnosed as suffering from emotional and social retardation."
After adoption, all of these children continued their destructive and
violent behavior.' 62
 Consequently, the adoptive parents brought suit
against the agency for fraud, breach of contract and malpractice.'"''
Although the Illinois Appeals Court would not allow the breach
of contract claim, the court did hold that the parents' claims of fraud
and malpractice were viable.'" The court looked to the Ohio Supreme
Court's decision in Burr for its reasoning that it would be a "travesty
of justice" if adoptive parents could not recover when agencies inten-
tionally misrepresented the health of a child.'" 5
 The court also coun-
tered the argument that fraud-based wrongful adoption claims would
hinder efforts to place handicapped children with families by conclud-
ing that a policy of truth and straightforward dealing would in fact
156 1d. at 356.
157 Id.
155 id.
in Id.
160 Catholic Charities, 588 N.E.2d at 356.
161 Id,
162 Id, One child cut the whiskers off the family cat and flattened his mother's tires. Id.
Another child painted a neighbor's house and exposed himself to neighbors. Id, The ihird child
had severe episodes of violent behavior requiring the aid of professional counseling. Id.
163 1d.
164 Id, at 360, 362, 366.
165 Catholic Charities, 588 N.E.2d at 357 (quoting Burr, 491 N.E.2d at 1107).
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greatly aid these placements.' 66 Because not all persons have the special
strength and values required to adopt a handicapped child, the court
reasoned, a policy of truth would ensure that only those who were
willing and able to care for such children would be entrusted with this
duty.' 67
 In addition, the court reasoned that if the adoptive parents
knew of any potential problems with their child, they could ensure that
the child received appropriate treatment as soon as possible. 168
Finally, in imposing a duty upon adoption agencies to disclose
background information, the court stated that any increased burden
on adoption agencies was slight relative to the need to preserve, en-
courage and strengthen the family unit. 169 The court reasoned that by
requiring an adoption agency to disclose all available information
regarding an adoptee to the adoptive parents, they could assume the
awesome responsibility of raising a child with full knowledge of what
it would entail for that particular child."" As a result, the court ex-
plained, the family unit would strengthen."' The burden on agencies
was considered by the court to be reasonable, if not inevitable, because
the agency is the only party to the adoption with any information
concerning the child's health and, thus, has no choice but to bear the
burden of disclosure."2 Accordingly, the Illinois Appeals Court held
that an agency had a duty to respond to adoptive parents' inquiries
about a prospective child by disclosing all available information it
possessed regarding the adoptee, that the agency had breached that
duty, and that as a direct and proximate result of that breach, the
adoptive families sustained damages."s
In the early 1990s, the Catholic Charities decision had a strong
impact on the decisions of other courts that were also considering the
implications of allowing recovery for wrongful adoption."' For exam-
ple, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in the 1994 case of Gibbs v.
Ernst, held that long-standing common law actions of fraud and neg-
166 /d. in 360.
167
16' Id.
169 id. a t 365.
170
 Catholic (Amities, 588 N.E.2d at 365.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id. In addition, the Illinois Court of Appeals refused to impose a duty upon agencies to
investigate the child's paternity. Id. at 361 (citing Petrowsky v. Family Serv. of Decatur, Inc., 518
N.E.2d 669, 668 (III. App. Ct. 1987)). On the issue of damages, the court implied that punitive
damages, though only allowed in rare circumstances, were a possibility in a wrongful adoption
action provided that the wrongful act was accompanied by aggravated circumstances, including
fraud, willfulness, wantonness, or malice. Id.
174 See, e.g., Mohr v. Commonwealth, 653 N.E.2d 1104, 1110-11 (Mass. 1995); Gibbs v. Ernst,
647 A.2d 882, 888 (Pa. 1994); Mallette v. Children's Friend & Serv., 661 A.2d 67, 69 (R.I. 1995).
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ligence could be extended to the adoption setting. 175 The court also
held that adoption agencies are under an obligation to reveal fully and
accurately all available non-identifying information about an adop-
tee.' 7"
In Gibbs, a couple who were already foster parents and were inter-
ested in adopting a healthy Caucasian infant approached an agency
about their prospects for adoption. 177 After telling the couple that there
was a two-year waiting list for such an infant, the agency informed them
that it would be easier if they adopted a child who was older and
therefore harder to place with an adoptive family. 178 The couple agreed
in 1983 that they would be willing to adopt such a child, as long as the
child had no history of sexual or physical abuse or any mental or
emotional problems.''`'
In 1984, the agency informed the couple that they had been
chosen to adopt a child who, although hyperactive, behind in his
school work and the victim of verbal abuse by his mother, was otherwise
normal.'" The agency specifically denied any history of physical or
sexual abuse.'"' Immediately after the child was adopted in 1985, how-
ever, he began experiencing severe emotional problems, characterized
by violence and extreme cruelty.' 82 Soon his conduct had deteriorated
to the point where he had to be placed in the custody of the Depart-
ment of Human Services ("DHS").'" In September 1989, a caseworker
from DHS informed the adoptive parents for the first time that the
child had been severely abused, both physically and sexually, as a young
child.'"' Records indicated that before the child was placed in numer-
ous foster homes, he had been abused physically and sexually by his
biological parents. 18' In response to these revelations, the parents brought
suit against the agency under the theories of wrongful adoption and
negligent placement of an adoptive child. 18"
175 547 A,2d at 887.
17"Id. at 892.
177 1r1, al 884.
in Id .
179 Id.
18"Gibbs, 647 A.2d at 884
-85.
181 Id. at 885.
182 Id. (attempting to amputate the arm of a five-year-Old, attempting to kill his cousin by
hitting him over the head with a lead pipe, and placing Clorox in a cleaning solution causing his
adoptive mother to severely burn her hands).
183 M
181 Id.
1811 Gibbs, 547 A.2d at 885-86. One incident of abuse involved the child's biological mother
trying to cm off the child's yields. Id. at 886.
186 ki
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In holding that adoption agencies can be sued for both negli-
gence and fraud, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania noted that many
authorities, such as the Illinois Appeals Court in Catholic Charities, had
recognized that an action for wrongful adoption is no more than an
extension of common law principles to the adoption setting. 187 Further-
more, in considering the competing interests of adoptive parents and
agencies, the court reasoned that the need of adoptive parents for
accurate medical and social information about their prospective child
outweighs any burden placed on adoption agencies.' Full and accu-
rate disclosure, according to the court, would ensure that adoptive
parents would be emotionally and financially equipped to raise a child
with special needs and would assist, rather than diminish, an agency's
effectiveness in placing children.' 89
Even more significant than this determination, however, was the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's holding that agencies have a duty to
reveal, fully and accurately, all available non-identifying information—
information which does not reveal the biological parents' identities—
about an adoptee. 19° In so holding, the court explained that even if this
duty had not been created by statute, the unique relationship between
the adoption agency and the adoptive parents gives rise to such a
responsibility.' 91
 Recognizing such a duty, the court further reasoned,
is important as a method of providing parents critical background
information about their prospective children.' 92 The court also ex-
plained that this duty is not unreasonable because it only requires
agencies to make reasonable efforts to disclose the medical history they
have already obtained. 193 Agencies do not have an additional duty,
based either in common law or under statute, to investigate a child's
background.'" For these reasons, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
became one of the first courts to hold not only that an adoption agency
is liable for its negligent and intentional misrepresentations, but also
that agencies have a duty to disclose all available information about a
prospective adoptee.' 95
197 Id. at 886, 887 (citing Catholic Charities, 588 N.E.2d at 357).
tg" See id. at 887.
"9 Id.
1111 Gibbs, 647 A.2d at 892.
191 Id. The court noted that such a relationship requires mist and confidence; after all, "[all)
adoption is not an arms-length sale of widgets." Id. at 893 (quoting D. Marianne Brower Blair,
Getting the Whole Truth and Nothing But the Truth: The Limits of Liability for Wrongful Adoption,
67 NoPRE DAME L REV. 851, 908 (1992)).
92 Id.
193 Id.
19 ' 1 Id. at 893-94.
195 Gibbs, 647 A.2d at 892.
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Despite the influence of Catholic Charities and Gibbs on other
jurisdictions' acceptance of a wrongful adoption action based in neg-
ligence, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island in Mallette v. Children's
Friend & Service was still hesitant to impose a duty to disclose upon
adoption agencies.' 96 In 1995, the Mallette court held that although
public policy does not preclude adoptive parents from maintaining a
claim for negligent misrepresentation against an adoption agency,
agencies have no concomitant duty to disclose relevant information to
adoptive parents.' 97 In Mallette, the adoptive parents approached an
agency in 1981 about the possibility of adopting a child. 1 "8 In 1982, the
agency notified the couple that a child was available whom they might
be interested in adopting.'`'`' According to the adoptive parents' com-
plaint, the agency negligently misrepresented and omitted certain in-
formation regarding the child's medical and family history: 4m In - 1991,
the adoptive parents first learned that the child's biological mother
suffered from a number of medical conditions, including macrocephaly,
tachycardia, tremors of the hands, and poor coordination:2m Soon
after these revelations, the adoptive parents brought suit against the
agency:2°2 The adoptive parents alleged that the agency negligently
failed to provide information and records about the child's back-
ground, negligently misrepresented that information and failed to
inform them of the child's probable need for future medical care.'"
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that public policy did
not preclude the adoptive parents from maintaining a claim for negli-
gent misrepresentation against the defendant agency. 2" Specifically,
the court agreed with the Appeals Court of Illinois's reasoning in
Catholic Charities that allowing suits in wrongful adoption did not
require the creation of a new tort. 205 Rather, the court recognized that
such a cause of action merely required a straightforward application
196 Mallette, 661 A.2d at 67, 71, 72, 73.
1117 Id, at 72, 73.
(Ott
	 at 68.
199 M
200 Id.
201 Mallette, 661 A,2d at 68, Macrocephaly, also known as megacephaly, is a condition, either
congenital or acquired, in which a person's head is abnormally large. SEEDMAN'S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 910, 934 (25th ed. 1990). Tachycardia is rapid beating of the heart, usually applied
to rates of over 100 beats per minute. See id. at 1550.
252 Mallette, 661 A.2d at 68.
213 id. The parents sought recovery for their emotional distress, the child's medical and
psychiatric treatment expenses, and lost opportunities for proper medical and psychiatric treat-
ment of the child. Id.
2(" Id. at 72.
"See id. at 69, 72 (citing Catholic Charities, 588 N.E.2d at 357).
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and extension of well-recognized common law actions, such as negli-
gence and fraud, to the adoption context." The Supreme Court of
Rhode Island also agreed with the Minnesota Supreme Court's reason-
ing in Caritas that allowing this cause of action would actually give
prospective parents more confidence in the adoption process and in
the accuracy of the information they receive during that process. 2°7
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island did, however, refuse to im-
pose a duty on adoption agencies to disclose a child's background
information unless the agency first volunteered the information."The
court implicitly reasoned that no duty of care previously existed under
statute or in common law requiring adoption agencies to disclose
relevant information about a child's background.'w To avoid liability,
an adoption agency could simply not disclose any information about
a child's medical background." If the agency did share the informa-
tion, it would only have to do so in a non-negligent manner.'" Thus,
the Supreme Court of Rhode Island determined that an adoption
agency can be held liable for negligent misrepresentations of a child's
health, but only if the agency first volunteers the information."'"
E. The Most Recent Case: Mohr v. Commonwealth
The most recent wrongful adoption case resolved a number of
related issues in favor of the adoptive parents. 213 On August 14, 1995,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Mohr v, Commonwealth
explicitly held that adoption agencies, public and private, are liable for
their negligent and intentional misrepresentations of an adoptee's
background, and that they have an affirmative duty to disclose relevant
information to adoptive parents. 2" The court added that adoptive
parents have no duty to investigate a child's background. 215 The Mohr
case involved a couple who stied an adoption agency after learning
21ffl See id. (citing Catholic Charities, 588 N.E.2d at 357).
2117 Mallette, 661 A.2d at 72 (quoting Caritas, 488 N.W.2d at 288),
20"See id. at 73.
211
" See id. at 70,
21"Id. at 73.
2 " Id.
212 Mallette, 661 A.2d at 73.
119 See Mohr v. Commonwealth, 653 N.E.2d 1104, 1109 (Mass, 1995) (determining when
statute of limitations begins to run); id. at 1112 (allowing claims for negligent and intentional
misrepresentations and requiring duty to disclose); id. at 1112 n.10 (holding affirmative duty to
disclose applies to both state and private adoption agencies); id. at 1112 n.I2 (holding no duty
of adoptive parents to investigate).
214 /d. at 1112 & n.10.
215 /d. at 1112 n.12.
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that their adopted child was mentally retarded instead of just small for
her age, as the agency had represented. 216 In considering whether
adoptive parents could bring a suit for wrongful adoption, the court
reasoned that this was not a new action but, rather, an extension of
well-recognized common law actions such as negligence and fraud. 217
The court further reasoned that the adoptive parents' need for an
adoptee's background information outweighed any increased burden
on adoption agencies:2 ' 8 Therefore, the court held that public policy
called for recognition of a claim of negligent or intentional wrongful
adoption and created a concomitant duty to disclose all available in-
formation about an adoptee's background. 21 "
In the early 1970s, the Mohrs approached the Department of
Public Welfare ("Department") seeking to adopt a child. 22° They at-
tended a number of the Department's educational meetings in which
they learned that certain special needs children were available for
adoption and that a subsidy was available to encourage their place-
ment. 22 ' In their adoption application, the Mohrs indicated that they
would accept a child with a correctable medical problem, and that they
would consider a child with an emotional problem. 222
In March 1974, the Mohrs were notified by a social worker in the
Department that a six-year-old girl named Elizabeth was available for
adoption. 223 The social worker described the biological mother as hav-
ing blonde hair, blue eyes, fair coloring and as being about five-feet-
one-inch tall and 130 pounds. 224 The social worker also stated that
Elizabeth had been removed from foster care because of alleged abuse,
had been hospitalized for malnutrition and had been examined for
dwarfism because of her small size. 225 After living with Elizabeth for two
years, the Mohrs finally adopted her in August 1976. 226
Just prior to her adoption, Elizabeth underwent neurological test-
ing and the Mohrs were told that she had a considerable behavioral
disruption and was a child of below average intelligence. 227 At this time,
216 /d. al 1105-06,1107-08.
2 L 7 /d. at 1109 11.8.
218 See Mohr, 653 N.E.2d at 1113.
2u ld. at 1112.
22° 1d. at 1107.
221m.
222a
223 _Mohr, 653 N.E.2d at 1107.
2211d .
225
2261d.
227 Id.
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the doctor recommended therapy with the whole family and an inpa-
tient evaluation to determine whether Elizabeth's problems were or-
ganic or related to early emotional deprivations. 228 The Mohrs did not
follow the doctor's recommendations until 1984, when they decided
to have the suggested inpatient evaluation performed. 229 It was only
then, in the course of obtaining previously unseen medical records
from the Department, that the Mohrs discovered that Elizabeth's mother
had been diagnosed as schizophrenic and that Elizabeth herself had
been previously diagnosed with mental retardation and cerebral atro-
phy."0 The Mohrs also discovered that Elizabeth's biological mother
was a committed mental patient with a dull normal level 1.Q . 231
though the social worker who placed Elizabeth apparently knew at least
some of this information, she failed to disclose it either to the Mohrs
or in the petition she prepared for submission to the probate court in
connection with Elizabeth's adoption. 2"2
The Mohrs brought suit to recover sufficient damages to enable
them to provide Elizabeth with the structured residential placement
she would need throughout her lifetime to obtain proper treatment
and supervision.'" They alleged that the Department negligently failed
to provide accurate and complete information about Elizabeth's back-
ground and that the Department negligently and fraudulently misrep-
resented Elizabeth's medical and family history. 2 ' The trial court en-
tered a judgment in favor of the Mohrs in the amount of two hundred
dollars, from which the Commonwealth (representing the state agency)
appealed directly to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts."5
One major consideration of the Supreme judicial Court was whether
it should even recognize a cause of action for wrongful adoption."
Holding that adoption agencies are liable for their intentional and
negligent misrepresentations made to adoptive parents about a child's
history prior to adoption, the court looked to other jurisdictions that
had addressed the issue to support its reasoning."' In so doing, the
229 Mohr, 653 N.E.2d at 1107.
229 M.
234
' Id. at 1106, 1107-08. The cerebrum is the part of the brain which includes the cerebral
cortex and basal ganglia. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL. DICTIONARY 280 (25th ed. 1990). Cerebral atrophy
is a wasting of the cerebrum. See id. at 151, 280.
231 Mohr, 653 N.E.2d at 1108.
232 /d. at 1107, 1108.
255 Id. at 1109.
251 Id. at 1105-06.
23,5
256 Mohr, 653 N.E.2d at 1109.
"7 ht. at 1109-11, 1112.
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court agreed with the Rhode Island Supreme Court and the Appeals
Court of Illinois that recognizing the tort of wrongful adoption re-
quires only the straightforward application of well-recognized common
law actions, rather than the creation of a new tort. 238 Furthermore, the
Mohr court reasoned that the compelling need for full disclosure of a
child's medical and familial background outweighs any increased bur-
den on adoption agencies. 239
 Prospective parents, the court concluded,
need this information not only to obtain timely and appropriate medi-
cal care for the child, but also to make an informed decision regarding
whether to adopt the child. 24° Because the adoption agency is the only
party with access to information about a child's background, the court
noted, full disclosure is especially needed in the adoption context. 241
As did the Caritas court, the Mohr court concluded that allowing
liability for negligent as well as intentional wrongful adoption does not
impose an onerous burden on adoption agencies. 242
 To avoid liability
for negligent wrongful adoption, an agency need only use due care to
ensure that it fully and adequately discloses information about a child's
background so as not to mislead potential parents.'" Therefore, the
Supreme Judicial Court held that public policy did not bar adoptive
parents from bringing a suit for wrongful adoption."'
Another major consideration of the Mohr court was whether or
not adoption agencies have a duty to disclose all known information
about prospective adoptees. 2" The court held that such a duty does
exist under statute. 2"6
 The court reasoned that the notion of good faith
and fair dealing dictates an affirmative duty to disclose, a duty that
applies to both public and private adoption agencies. 2"7 In so holding,
the court analogized adoption to business transactions where there is
a duty to disclose material facts known to one party at the time of the
transaction.248
 Finally, the court reasoned that the adoptive parents'
238 Id, at 1109 n.8, 1110,
2" See id. at 1112, 1113.
24" hi. at 1112.
241 Mohr, 653 N.E.2d at 1112.
242 Id. at 1113 (citing Caritas, 488 NAK2d at 287).
243 Id.
244 Id. (citing Mallette, 661 A.2d at 72, which finds "recognition of such a tort would tactually]
promote public policy").
245 See id. at 1112.
246
 Mohr, 653 N.E.2d at 1112 (citing MAss. RE CS. CODE lit. 110, § 7.213(3) (1994), which
states in relevant part that "Department of Social Services] shall provide the adoptive parents
with all relevant infitrmation about a child to enable the adoptive parent to knowledgeably
determine whether to accept the child for adoption.").
2 ' 17 /d. al 1112 n.10.
2411 See id.
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need for full disclosure of a child's medical and familial background
severely outweighs any increased burden upon adoption agencies. 219
Thus, the court held that an adoption agency has an affirmative duty
to disclose to adoptive parents information about a child that will
enable them to make an informed decision about whether to adopt a
child. 25"
A third major consideration of the Supreme judicial Court was
determining at what point the applicable statute of limitations begins
to run in wrongful adoption claims, some of which are brought many
years after the actual adoption. 25 ' in Mohr, the court specifically had to
decide whether the Mohrs' claim was barred by a three-year statute of
limitations. 2" The court held that the Mohrs had appropriately com-
menced this action within the three-year statutory period, reasoning
that, in the absence of a governing statute, the statute of limitations
would not begin to run until the date when the plaintiffs knew or
should have known that they had been harmed by the defendant's
conduct. 2" The court applied this discovery rule, reasoning that it
would be unfair to hold that a claim had expired even before a plaintiff
knew or should have known of the harm. 254 According to special ques-
tions presented to the jury, the Mohrs did not know the agency had
harmed them until February 1984, less than three years before they
filed their claim.255 Thus, the court held that the applicable statute of
limitations had not expired and the Mohrs' claim of wrongful adop-
tion, therefore, was timely. 256 Because the Mohrs' claim had not been
time-barred, and because the court was willing to recognize claims for
negligent and intentional wrongful adoption against public and private
adoption agencies, the court therefore held that the Mohrs had a
viable claim and affirmed the lower court's judgment in their favor:257
H. IMPLICATIONS OF THE MOHR DECISION: BOLSTERING ADOPTIVE
PARENTS' RIGHTSurrs
By resolving a number of important issues in favor of adoptive
parents, the Supreme judicial Court in Mohr took a much needed step
21" See id. at 1112, 1113.
25" Id. at 1112.
251 1140hr, 653 N.E.2d at 1109.
252 Id. at 1109 n.7.
253 Id. at 1109.
25 '1 Id.
2551d.
256
 Mohr, 653 N.E.2d at 1109.
2" See id. at 1109, 1112, 1112 n.10, 1112 ih12, 1115.
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toward giving adoptive parents more rights in the adoption process. 258
The Mohr court not only held that agencies could be held liable for
their negligent and intentional misrepresentations, but it also clearly
determined when adoption agencies may be held liable (at what point
the statute of limitations begins to run), and exactly which actions
(misrepresentations) or inactions (nondisclosure) could result in li-
ability. 259
 The court further bolstered adoptive parents' rights by hold-
ing that the duty to disclose to adoptive parents information about a
child's background applies to both public and private adoption agen-
cies,'" Although both public and private agencies have been the sub-
ject of wrongful adoption suits in different states, the Mohr court was
the only court to explicitly state that both have a duty to disclose
background information to adoptive parents. 261 In so doing, the Mohr
court emphasized the need for agency disclosure of background inlbr-
mation in the adoption process, something which few courts in other
jurisdictions have clone. 262 Finally, the Mohr court held that adoptive
parents do not have a duty to investigate a child's background for
themselves.2"3
 This is also essential to bolstering adoptive parents' rights
because it protects adoptive parents, who do not have the expertise or
ability to conduct investigations of prospective children as thoroughly
as adoption agencies, from comparative negligence claims. Through
its clear, unprecedented decision, the Mohr court appropriately strength-
ened adoptive parents' rights and set an example that courts in other
jurisdictions should follow.
The reasoning behind the Mohr decision should be adopted by
other courts because it takes into careful consideration the unique
features of an adoption. 2" These features make disclosure imperative
and justify holding agencies liable for their misrepresentations. 265 First,
the purpose of an adoption is to place a child with a family who will
958
 See id. 1104, 1109, 1112, 1112 n.10, 1112 n.12).
259 Id. at 1100, 1112.
20
 Id. at 1112 n.10.
261 Compare Mohr, 653 N.E.2r1 at 1112 it.10 (explicitly requiring both state and private
agencies to disclose) with. Michael" v, County of Los Angeles Dep't ()I' Adoptions, 297 Cal. Rpir.
509, 513 (Ct. App. 1988) (no explicit requirement for state agency to disclose) and M.H. &
v. Caritas Family Set -vs., 488 N.W.2d 28'2, 288 (Minn. 1992) (no explicit requirement for private
agency to disclose).
See Mohr, 653 N.E.2d at 1112. In fact, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania In Gibbs was the
only other court to hold that adoption agencies have a duty to reveal fully and accurately all
available information about an adoptee. Gibbs v. Ernst, 647 A.2d 882, 892 (Pa. 1994).
' 6:3 See Mohr 653 N.E.2d at 1112-13 n.12.
See id. at 1112.
2M See id.
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give the child the love, support and care that every child needs. 266
Adoptive parents cannot provide the child with appropriate support
and care unless they have accurate medical and other relevant infor-
mation about the adoptee. When the child has special needs, this
information is particularly critical if adoptive parents are to obtain
timely and appropriate treatment for the adoptee. 267
 If adoptive par-
ents are not fully aware of a child's background, energy that could
otherwise be spent showering affection upon the child will inevitably
be spent feeling sad, frustrated and angry upon discovering that their
child has serious physical or emotional problems that the adoption
agency knew of but never disclosed. 268 Because the adoption agency is
the only party with access to such information, and because adoptive
parents need this information if an adoption is to be successful, the
adoption agency carries the burden of accurately passing on that
information to those who can use it best—the adoptive parents. 2'"
Second, the decision whether or not to adopt a child is significantly
different from the decision whether or not to have a child of one's
own. Although there are always certain risks associated with having a
child, either biologically or through adoption, biological parents have
the advantage of knowing what diseases occur in the family and thus
may be passed down to their child:470 just as natural parents weigh these
risks, adoptive parents should be able to consider all the factors that
might affect their decision to become parents of a particular child. 271
Adoptive parents can only do so if they are given all available informa-
tion about an adoptee from the source who knows the child's history
best—the adoption agency placing the child. 272 Even more significantly,
many of the disorders suffered by adoptees are caused by third parties,
such as a birth mother who used alcohol or drugs during pregnancy
or biological or foster parents who sexually or physically abused the
child. 2" The likelihood that a child will have to cope with fetal alcohol
266 .561 Blair, supra note 191, at 894; Sanfbrd N. Kau, Rewriting the Adoption Story, FA M. L.
Anvoc. Summer, 1982, at 9, 10.
267 See Mohr, 653 N.E.2d at 1112.
21 '8 See Dickson, supra note 28, al 945.
26'3 See Mohr, 653 N.E.2d at 1112.
270 See id.
271 Id .
272 1n considering whether wrongful adoption claims threatened the biological parents'
interests in concealing their identities, the court noted that wrongful adoption claims did not
undermine those interests. See id, at 1113. Adoption agencies could simply provide information
about a child's medical and familial background without disclosing the biological parents' iden-
tities. Id.
273 See. Dickson, supra note 28, at 944.
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syndrome, prenatal drug addiction or the scars of abuse is primarily
within the control of the biological or foster parents. 274 Adopters should
have the same ability to control whether they will accept responsibility
for children who have such problems.275 Thus, requiring disclosure
would give prospective parents more confidence in the adoption proc-
ess and ensure that intermediaries place adoptees with a family that is
receptive and understanding of their special needs. 276
Finally, those agencies and individuals who facilitate adoptions
function very differently from the doctor who assists in the birth of a
child. Like a doctor, the facilitator guides the parents through the
required procedures and is concerned about the parents' happiness
from the beginning until the child is "delivered." An adoption inter-
mediary has other concerns, however, that a doctor does not have. An
intermediary must also consider whether the biological parents are
committed to the adoption proceeding and whether the adoption is
in the best interests of the child.'" Before imposing a duty upon
adoption agencies to disclose an adoptee's background information, a
court must carefully consider the practical effects of wrongful adoption
claims upon those agencies and individuals who facilitate adoptions: 278
After weighing these considerations, however, a court would un-
doubtedly conclude, as did the Mohr court, that requiring adoption
agencies to accurately disclose an adoptee's background information
in a non-negligent manner does not impose any extraordinary or
onerous burdens upon adoption agencies.279
 To avoid liability, an agency
need only use due care to ensure that it fully and correctly discloses
all available information about an adoptee's background. 2"0 Practically
speaking, this would only require looking through the adoptee's file
and conveying any medical or other background information to pro-
spective parents. Intermediaries would also not be guarantors of an
adoptee's future health because the notion of foreseeability, as found
in the concepts of duty and proximate cause, places significant limits
on an intermediary's liability. 28 ' The alternative, denying adoptive par-
ents any recourse against adoption agencies for their nondisclosure or
274
275 Id.
279 See Mohr, 653 N.E.2d at 1112-13; Blair, supra note 191 at. 882-83; Dickson, supra note 28,
at 949.
277 See Schwartz, ,sapra note 13, it 813-14.
2" See Mohr, 653 N.E.2d at 1113.
270 See id.
280 Id.
281 Id.; Gibbs, 647 A.2d at 891; see Roe v. Catholic Charities, 588 N.E.2d 354,364 (111. App. Ct.
1992).
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misrepresentations regarding a child's background, is simply not a
result that a court should sanction. 282
The Mohr decision is exemplary in many respects, particularly in
that it gives much needed support to adoptive parents' rights by clearly
resolving a number of issues in their favor. 283
 Admittedly, however,
without knowing the court's reasoning behind the decision, it may not
be dear why courts in other jurisdictions should follow this decision.
The Mohr court concluded that recognition of the wrongful adoption
claim merely requires the application of common-law principles to the
adoption context. 284
 The law does not, however, seem to allow recovery
for persons in other related situations. For example, if a husband
discovers that his wife made misrepresentations before their marriage
regarding her physical or emotional well-being, he cannot recover the
kinds of damages otherwise available in a divorce proceeding. 285 At
most, the husband may be able to annul the marriage. 286 It appears,
thus, that looking to related situations may not help one determine
whether adoptive parents should recover when an agency makes mis-
representations about their adopted child.
As stated above, however, the adoption process and the relation-
ship between the adoptive parents and the adoptee are unique. Fur-
thermore, the adoptive relationship is too distinctive to compare it to
other kinds of relationships. Primarily, the adoptee-adoptive parents'
relationship is unique in that the stability of this relationship depends
almost entirely on a third party—the intermediary placing the child." 7
The adoptive parents rely upon the adoption intermediary to provide
them not only with a child but also with any information that will help
them to care for the child. The adoptee also depends upon the inter-
mediary to place him or her with a family that will provide adequate
282 See Mohr, 653 N.E.2d at 1113.
2" See id. at 1100, 1112, 1112 11.10, 1112-13
284 id.
285
 The reason Err this bar is that divorce conceptually requires grounds that have occurred
only after the marriage. WALTER 0. WEYRAUCH In-
 AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW:
LEGAL CONCEPTS AND CHANGING HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS 511 (1994). Thus, the remedies avail-
able in a divorce pnweeding, such as rehabilitative alimony, are not available where the grounds
for the action arose prior to the marriage. See III at 625-27 (discussing the development of the
"rehabilitative alimony" remedy and how it signals the evolution of marriage toward a cotitractual
relationship).
288 Anntilment is the appropriate remedy where the grounds for a suit between spouses arise
before the marriage. Id. at 511. Obtaining an ann u lment is a difficult task, however, as one must
prove: 1) the grounds for the annulment existed prior to the marriage; 2) as a result, marital
consent has been impaired; and 3) the fraud itself was of an extreme nature going to the essential
aspects of the marriage. Id.
287 See Mohr, 653 N.E.2d at 1112.
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care and that is willing to cater to any of the adoptee's special needs.
Thus, the foundation of the adoptee-adoptive parents' relationship
completely depends on the agency or facilitator placing the child.
Hence, requiring that an adoption intermediary perform its job thor-
oughly is the most effective way of ensuring that the adoption process
is minimally disruptive to all parties involved. 288
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF ALLOWING RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL
ADOPTION CLAIMS BASED IN NEGLIGENCE
As a number of jurisdictions have recognized a claim against
adoption agencies for their negligent misrepresentations, the Mohr
court was not revolutionary in similarly recognizing such a claim. 28"
The Mohr court's decision to allow negligent misrepresentation claims
is nonetheless important to the development of the wrongful adoption
suit for a number of reasons. First, an adoption agency's affirmative
representations about an adoptee will not always rise to the level of
being intentional or fraudulent. In Meracle, the agency accurately re-
vealed to the prospective parents that Huntington's Disease existed in
the adoptee's background. 2" The misrepresentation occurred when
the agency negligently stated that the child would not run any in-
creased risk of contracting the disease despite her background. 291
 Simi-
larly, in Caritas, the adoption agency affirmatively and correctly stated
to the prospective parents that there was a possibility of incest in the
adoptee's family. 2"2
 The agency in Caritas failed to mention, however,
that the adoptee's parents were a seventeen-year-old boy and his thir-
teen-year-old sister. 293 In both Meracle and Caritas, the agencies' repre-
sentations were not so diametrically opposed to the truth that one
could consider them fraudulent or intentional. Yet if those courts had
not allowed the adoptive parents' wrongful adoption claims based in
negligence, the adoptive parents would not have been able to recover
for the real damages caused by the agencies' negligence. 294
 These
damages are no less immense than those sought in a fraudulent wrong-
ful adoption suit, and could run as high as ten million dollars for the
2" See Dickson, .kupra note 28, at 945.
2E5 Mohr v. Commonwealth, 653 N.E.2d 1104, 1112 (Mass. 1995); Gibbs v. Ernst, 647 A.2d
882, 887 (Pa. 1994); Mallette v. Children's Friend & Sen., 661 A.2d 67, 72 (RI. 1995).
29°
 Meracie v. Children's Scrv. Soc'y, 437 N.W.2d at 532, 533 (Wis. 1989).
251 1d. at 533, 537.
212 	&	 v. Caritas Family Servs., 488 N.W.2d 282, 284 (Minn. 1992).
293 Id. at 285.
29' See id.; Merark 437 N.W.2d at 537.
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child's medical expenses and for the adoptive parents' pain and suf-
fering, lost wages and loss of the child's companionship. 295
Courts in earlier cases that failed to recognize wrongful adoption
claims based in negligence were concerned that allowing these claims
would in effect make adoption agencies guarantors of an adoptee's
future good heahh.296 In particular, the Burr court was concerned that
negligent misrepresentation claims would in effect create untenable
contracts of insurance, in which an adoption agency had a duty to ensure
that each child adopted would mature to be healthy and happy. 297 As
mentioned above, however, the notion of foreseeability, as found in the
concepts of duty and proximate cause, places significant limits on an
intermediary's liability.'" Furthermore, to avoid liability for wrongful
adoption based on negligence, an adoption intermediary need only
use due care to ensure that it fully and adequately discloses informa-
tion about a child's background so as not to mislead prospective par-
ents.29• Thus, intermediaries, subject to wrongful adoption claims based
in negligence, will not become guarantors of the health and happiness
of the children they place. Rather, they will be given the appropriate
responsibility of passing on, in a non-negligent manner, information
that is essential to the health and happiness of the children they
p lace . 300
Another reason why adoption intermediaries should be liable for
their negligent misrepresentations is that adoptive parents may not
otherwise be able to bring a claim against state adoption agencies. 501
In holding that adoption agencies are liable for their negligent mis-
representations, the Mohr court recognized the difficulty of suing state
adoption agencies when they are statutorily immune from liability for
certain actions. 302 In Mohr, the Massachusetts Torts Claims Act provided
that an agency could not be liable for any claim arising out of an
intentional tort, including misrepresentation." In other words, adop-
tive parents could not sue state adoption agencies for their intentional
misrepresentations about an adoptee. 504 Absent a wrongful adoption
295
 Meracle, 437 N.W.2d at 533-34.
296 M ichael J. v. County of Los Angeles Dep't of Adoptions, 247 Cal. Rptr. 504, 512 (Ct. App.
1988); Burr v, Board of County Conno'rs, 491 N,E,2(1. 1101, 1109 (Ohio 1986).
297 Burr, 491 N.E.2d at 1109.
299 See Mohr, 653 N.E.2d at 1113; Roesi. Catholic Charities, 588 N.E.2d 354, 364 (Iii. App. Ct.
1992); Gibbs, 647 A.2d at 891.
299 Mohr, 653 N.E.2d at 1113.
See id. at 1112.
SW 	at 1113.
31)2 id.
309 id.
3().1 Mohr, 653 N.E.2d at 1113.
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claim based in negligence, then, adoptive parents would have abso-
lutely no recourse against state adoption agencies for their misrepre-
sentations. 3°5 The Mohr court, stating that it could not sanction such
a result, thus recognized wrongful adoption claims based in negli-
gence.30" Other jurisdictions that similarly provide immunity for state
agencies may likewise run into this dilemma. After the Mohr decision,
however, these states have a model solution to the problem—recogni-
tion of negligent, not just intentional, misrepresentation claims in the
adoption context. 307
IV. GIVING SUBSTANCE '1'0 THE WRONGFUL ADOPTION CLAIM 1W
IMPOSING A DUTY TO DISCLOSE
Another important requirement established by the Mohr court is
the affirmative duty of adoption agencies to disclose relevant back-
ground information to adoptive parents. 308 The only other court to
even approach imposing such a duty was the Illinois Appeals Court in
Catholic Charities.'" Both of these courts recognized that imposing a
duty to disclose served the important societal goal of allowing prospec-
tive parents to assume the responsibility of parenthood only after they
are fully informed as to what parenthood entails. 31 " In an adoption, this
goal can be served only if prospective parents are aware of any special
responsibilities they must assume for a particular child. 3 " Prospective
parents cannot know the scope of those special responsibilities unless
the intermediary discloses background information.'" Because adop-
tion intermediaries are the only party with this information, the bur-
den rightly falls upon them to provide it to the adoptive parents.'"
Without a duty to disclose, adoption agencies could avoid liability
by simply not making any affirmative representations about an adop-
tee's health. 314 In Mallette, Meracle and Gibbs, the courts reasoned that
by not having an affirmative duty to disclose, adoption agencies were
prevented from becoming guarantors of an adoptee's future health.'''
The problem with this rationale, however, is that it creates a perverse
305
N 11 ' See id.
3" See id. at 1112.
353 Mohr v. Commonwealth, 653 N.E.2d, 1104, 1112 (Mass. 1995).
3151 See Roe v. Catholic Charities, 588 N.E.2d 354, 365 (111. App. Ct. 1992).
3111 Mohr, 653 N.E.2d at 1112; Catholic Charities, 588 N.E.2d at 365.
311 See. Mohr, 653 N.E.2d at 11 12; Catholic Chantise, 588 N.E.2d at 365.
312
 See Mohr, 653 N.E.2d at 1112; Catholic Charities, 588 N.E.2d at 365.
313 Catholic Charities, 588 N.E.2d at 365.
314 See Gibbs v. Ernst, 647 A.2d 882, 801 (Pa. 1994); Mallette v. Children's Friend & Serv., 661
A.2d 67, 73 (R.I. 1995); Meracle v. Children's Serv. Soc'y, 437 N.W.2d at 532, 537 (Wis. 1089).
315
 See Mallette, 661 A.2d at 73; Gibbs, 647 A.2d at 891, Meracle, 437 N.W.2d at 537,
1008	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 37:975
incentive for adoption agencies to remain silent. 316
 Some adoptive
parents may be particularly keen or familiar with the adoption process
and ask questions that force an agency to break their "code of silence."
Those who are not as knowledgeable, however, may soon find them-
selves consumed by unexpected medical or other expenses with no way
to alleviate that burclen. 317
In the long run, imposing a duty upon adoption agencies to
disclose relevant information will not only deter agencies from making
misrepresentations but also will allow adoptive parents to be compen-
sated for the unexpected expenses incurred for the adoptee's treat-
ment. 318 Another favorable consequence would be the encouragement,
preservation and strengthening of the family unit. 31 " Finally, as the
Mohr court pointed out, requiring agencies to disclose background
information will actually give potential parents more confidence in the
adoption process and in the accuracy of the information they receive. 32°
Imposing an affirmative duty to disclose upon adoption agencies is
therefore essential to making a wrongful adoption claim an effective
means of recovery for adoptive parents.
V. GIVING ADOPTIVE PARENTS TIME TO DISCOVER THE HARM:
DETERMINING WHEN THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BEGINS TO RUN
Because adoptive parents may not bring wrongful adoption claims
until years after an adoption, one of the most important decisions a
court must make in the face of such a claim is whether the action is
barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 321 The Mohr court held
that, in a wrongful adoption case, the statute of limitations does not
begin to run until the adoptive parents discover, or reasonably should
have discovered, that they have been harmed by the agency's misrep-
resentations. 322 Courts in other jurisdictions should follow the Mohr
court's determination of this issue because allowing parents to bring a
claim only after they have discovered the harm and who caused it is
316
 See Malletle, 661 A.2d at 73.
317 It is important to note that the Mohr court would not hold that parents themselves had
a duty to investigate a child's background. Mohr, 653 N.E.2d at 1112-13 n.12. As a result, agencies
cannot use comparative negligence theory as a defense. See id. This not only recognizes that
adoptive parents have needs which society recognizes as important but it also implies that the
burden is truly on intermediaries, and not prospective parents, to make sure those needs have
been fulfilled. See id.
318 See id. at 1105, 1109.
319 Catholic Charities, 588 N.E.2d at 365.
3211 Mohr, 653 N.E.2d at 1112-13.
321 See Mohr v. Commonwealth, 653 N.E.2d 1104, 1109 (Mass. 1995).
322 Id.
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essential to making a wrongful adoption claim an effective means of
recovery for adoptive parents." 2" Adoptive parents cannot bring a wrong-
ful adoption claim. unless they know who to sue and what to sue for,
and they cannot make these determinations until they first discover
that there is something wrong with their child." 1 Without relevant
background information about the adoptee, adoptive parents do not
have a context in which to place their child's behavior and determine
whether it is abnormal at all. Thus, it could easily take years for
adoptive parents to discover that their child even has a physical or
emotional disorder, let alone that the adoption agency that placed the
child knew that the child had the disorder at the time of adoption. ' 25'
Furthermore, as the Mohr court pointed out, courts should not require
adoptive parents to investigate a child's background on their own."6
Without disclosure of background information, adoptive parents will
never fully understand their child's problems or know how to best treat
their child.
Limiting the amount of time adoptive parents have to discover
that their child has problems to a set number of years also would be
extremely unfair. Because each case involves a distinct set of facts, the
amount of time in which adoptive parents could reasonably determine
that their child has a problem, and that the adoption agency knew of
this problem at the time of the adoption, would vastly differ in each
case. Under the Mohr court's rule, adoptive parents at least have an
appropriate amount of time to discover that their child has special
needs."' Adoptive parents have until they discover or reasonably should
have discovered that their child has special needs and that the adop-
tion agency placing the child knew, but failed to inform them, of those
needs."'
Not only is it fundamentally lair for a statute of limitations to run
only after plaintiffs know they have been harmed and by whom, but it
also gives prospective parents more confidence in the adoption proc-
323 see id
.
See id,
525 See id. at 1107—OH, 1109. In Mohr, the court affirmed the jury's finding that the adoptive
parents knew or should have known as of February 1984, almost eight years after they had adopted
the child, the material facts filming the basis ()I' their action. Id. at 1109, Although the adoptive
parents were aware even betUre the adoption that the adoptee had a low average intelligence and
engaged in disruptive behavior, until they conducted further tests in 1984, they never knew that
the adoptee actually had been diagnosed with cerebral atrophy and mental retardation. See id.
at 1107-08.
326 Mohr, 653 N.E.2d at 1112—l3 n.12,
327 See id. at 1109.
528
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ess.329 Adoptive parents are less apt to feel like they are taking a risk if
they know that in the future, should they discover that the agency made
misrepresentations about their child, they will not be barred from suit
simply because a set number of years has passed since the child's
adoption. Consequently, knowing that a wrongful adoption action may
be brought against them at any point, even years after they have
completed the adoption, adoption agencies should have incentive to
disclose information accurately throughout the adoption process.
VI. EXAMINING THE EFFECTS OF A WRONGFUL ADOPTION CLAIM
UPON INTERMEDIARIES AND ADOPTEES
A. Wrongful Adoption Claims and the Duty to Disclose: How Heavy is
the Burden on Agencies and Facilitators?
As wrongful adoption suits arise in jurisdictions that have not yet
addressed these claims, courts in those jurisdictions will need to evalu-
ate the effects of these claims on all parties to the adoption, including
the adoption agencies and facilitators. Because these intermediaries
are usually the only source of information regarding adoptees, the
burden necessarily falls on them to make sure that that information is
passed on to the adoptive parents. 33° Intermediaries not only have a
moral duty to disclose this information, to do so in a non-negligent,
non-fraudulent manner is neither unduly difficult nor time consum-
ing."st Practically speaking, it does not seem that intermediaries need
to do much more than disclose fully and accurately all available infor-
mation they possess about an adoptee. 332 This may require them to
spend more time with prospective parents discussing an adoptee's
background, but at least, courts are not requiring intermediaries to
undertake costly family history verifications or testing to discover hid-
den genetic-related conditions. 333 Thus, the extra time agencies and
facilitators must spend to disclose background information is minimal.
To avoid liability and still carry on a successful practice, an intermedi-
ary need only use due care to ensure that it fully and adequately
22° See id.
23° See Mohr v. Commonwealth, 653 N.E.2d 1104, 1112 (Mass. 1995); Roe v. Catholic Charities,
588 N.E.2d 354, 365 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
"I See, e.g., Mohr, 653 N.E.2d at 1112; Catholic Charities, 588 N.E.2d at 365; M.N. Bc	 v.
Caritas Family Servs., 488 N.W.2d 282, 288 (Minn. 1992).
322 See Mohr, 653 N.E.2d at 1112; Catholic Charities, 588 N.E.2d at 365.
333 See Mohr, 653 N.E.2d at 1113.
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discloses the information about an adoptee that it has in its posses-
sion."4
Adoption agencies that usually provide background information
and follow formal procedures would not be as affected by the imposi-
tion of a duty to disclose as a facilitator of an independent adoption
could be. Agencies could simply include a "disclosure session" in the
list of procedures that its employees must follow in the adoption
process. The only potential problem for agencies, but not facilitators,
is that a public agency may lose money if its funding is related to the
number of placements it makes and the number of placements de-
creases because more time is spent with each set of potential parents."'
Facilitators, while not at risk of losing funds, instead face greater
problems. These problems stem from the fact that, as a whole, Facilita-
tors are less likely to collect background information and to recognize
the need to pass it on to prospective parents.""'' As a result, they may
actually run a higher risk of being sued than adoption agencies.
The consequences of a wrongful adoption suit are also more
drastic for independent facilitators. Facilitators of independent adop-
tions are individuals representing themselves and will always be sued
personally, rather than as an employee of a larger, bureaucratic adop-
tion agency. One lawsuit against a facilitator may be enough to ruin
that person for life, as that person may never be able to repair the
damage done to his or her reputation. Agencies, on the other hand,
are less personal and are in the business of placing children with
adoptive families."7 Consequently, they are more likely to attract pro-
spective parents despite a tarnished reputation because of the high
demand for adoptable children, while also having greater financial
resources than many individuals. Thus, people who facilitate inde-
pendent adoptions must consider the serious consequences of being
sued for wrongful adoption if they do not take care to disclose fully
and accurately any information they obtain about an adoptee. 3'48
"4 See id.
"6 Blair, sup-a note 191, at 869 n.82 (noting that both private and public adoption agencies
are under financial pressure to place children hastily).
"6 See MEEZAN, supra note 43, at 6.
"7 See id. at 10-11.
""Another potential legal ethics problem involving independent adoptions is that facilitators
who represent both the biological patents and the adoptive parents represent conflicting inter-
ests. See MEEZAN, supra note 43, at I0-1 I . Some may view adoptions as a non-adversarial proceed-
ing, where a child, lin• whom the biological parents cannot care, is given to a family Mat is able
to care for the child, See Schwartz, supra note 13, at 814. In actuality, however, the biological and
adoptive parents have competing interests which can only be advocated by different attorneys.
See id. This is especially true for independent adoptions, where biological parents sometimes have
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B. Constitutional Claims Against State Adoption Agencies: Comparing
Liability for Foster Care Decisions
As of yet, no set of adoptive parents has brought a constitutional
claim against a state adoption agency. One can easily imagine, however,
a scenario in which adoptive parents bring suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against a state adoption agency, claiming that the agency's decision not
to disclose background information about the adoptee deprived the
adoptee of his liberty without due process of law.339
 In this situation,
because there are no existing cases involving constitutional claims by
adoptive parents, a court would have to consider the analogous sce-
nario of a state's liability for its foster care decisions.
In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, the
United States Supreme Court held that a state agency cannot be con-
stitutionally liable for its placement decisions concerning foster care. 34"
The Court reasoned that once the state returned Joshua to his father's
custody, the state agency could not be liable for the private violence of
his abusive father, who was not in any way a state actor. 341
 Although an
agency may he liable for its decisions regarding individuals who are in
the state's custody and wholly dependent upon the state, e.g., prison-
ers, the Court held that agencies could not be constitutionally liable
for harms that occurred while the victim was not in state custody. 342
At first glance, the DeShaney decision may appear to impede a
constitutional claim in the adoption context, but closer examination
quickly diminishes this possibility. D eShaney 's focus on foster care place-
ment decisions distinguish it from the decision whether or not to
disclose background information about an adoptee. 343 The policy con-
cerns that might have led to the Court's decision in DeShaney simply
do not exist in the adoption context. 344
In the context of foster care, there are a number of valid reasons
why state agencies should not be constitutionally liable for their deci-
sions concerning placement. First, employees in state agencies—social
a say in the placement of their child. See id. just as a party cannot be in privity of contract with
two opposing parties, an independent facilitator should not he serving two masters—the biologi-
cal and adoptive parents. See MEItZAN, ,Supra note 43, at 10-11,
" For example, this scenario could occur where the adoption agency decides not to disclose
to the adoptive parents that an adoptee has a disease curable in its early stages, and as a result,
the parents do not provide the child with proper treatment and the child dies.
sate DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989).
3 ' 11 Id. at 197, 201.
312 See id. at 2(10, 201.
See id. at 197, 201.
344 See id. at 200, 201.
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workers, supervisors and administrators—make numerous foster care
decisions every day."" It would not be practical to hold state agencies
liable for every single one of those decisions. Doing so would create
an incredible potential for liability and would slow down the decision-
making process immensely, perhaps creating a bureaucratic nightmare. 34"
Second, holding state agencies liable for their employees' decisions
concerning foster care is difficult because these decisions are highly
discretionary." It would be extremely hard to second-guess a social
worker's placement decisions when they are based primarily on the
social worker's subjective observations and personal beliefs as to what
is in the best interests of the foster child. 'x Finally, damages would be
difficult to determine in this context, unless the plaintiffs could clearly
allocate dollar amounts to definite harms.s''" Otherwise, the more in-
tangible harms that may result from an improper placement would be
difficult to quantify.'n 0
 For these policy reasons, it is understandable
why state agencies should not be liable for their decisions concerning
foster care.
In the adoption context, however, these policy reasons do not
apply. Unlike the numerous decisions made regarding each foster
child, only one decision needs to be made with every adoption regard-
ing whether or not to disclose an adoptee's background information.
Holding adoption agencies liable for these decisions therefore would
not constantly expose them to liability as it would state agencies making
decisions regarding foster care.351
 Nor would the potential for liability
significantly slow the adoption process, because not every decision
regarding adoption would need a supervisor's approval. In fact, the
"decision" to disclose background information really does not involve
1415 See South v. Organization or Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816,835 n.30
(1977) (noting that social workers' heavy caseloads may make judicial review of their decisions
concerning foster care merely perfunctory).
1416
 Fur example, every decision Might need at least one supervisor's approval before being
acted upon. See id. at 839-35,
347 Id, at 835, n.36 (noting that despite statutory limitations, state agencies have considerable
discretion in deciding whether or not to return child to the natural parent).
348 See id. at 834 (citing studies that suggest that social workers of middle-class backgrounds,
albeit unconsciously, arc inclined to favor continuing placement of child in foster care with
highemtatus family over returning the child to his natural parents, thus reflecting bias that treats
natural parents' poverty and lifestyle as prejudicial to best interests of child).
mu See id, at 840. It would be difficult to place a dollar value tin the "grievous loss" resulting
from the disruption of the stable relationships needed by a child, caused by a social worker's
decision to remove a child from a foster family. See id.
3511 See Smith, 431 U.S. at 840.
351 See id. at 835 ii.30 (recognizing heavy caseload of social workers who make luster care
decisions).
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discretion or consideration of the particular situation. All it involves is
full disclosure of an adoptee's background information to every set_ of
prospective parents. 352
 Holding state adoption agencies liable for not
disclosing this information would not require any second-guessing or
re-evaluation of that decision. Courts need only determine whether a
social worker disclosed information, and not why he or she failed to
do so. Lastly, damages could be more easily determined in the adop-
tion context. Recovery could easily be tailored to an adoptee's specific
needs, because all that is required is a medical doctor's diagnosis. For
all of these reasons, courts should not hesitate to hold state agencies
constitutionally liable when they fail to disclose background informa-
tion to adoptive parents. There may be good reasons not to hold state
agencies liable for their decisions concerning foster care, but these
reasons do not apply to the adoption context. In fact, the ease with
which a state agency can avoid liability, combined with the potentially
devastating consequences to the adoptee, mandates holding state agen-
cies constitutionally liable for their misrepresentations or non-disclo-
sure of an adoptee's background.
On the issue of whether state agencies could be liable in other
contexts, the United States Supreme Court in DeShaney did leave open
the possibility of holding state agencies liable under state law for
tort-like claims. 353
 The Court implicitly reasoned that an agency may
be held liable either because of the special relationship between the
agency and the foster child or because, under tort law, one who renders
services to another must do so in a non-negligent fashion."SA Applying
this reasoning to the adoption context, holding state agencies liable
under state tort law for their misrepresentations during the adoption
process is completely reasonable." 55 An adoption agency arguably has
a special relationship with the adoptive parents, and an adoption
agency clearly provides services to adoptive parents."6
 Thus, as the
Mohr court noted, it would not require the creation of a whole new
tort to recognize a claim for wrongful adoption. 357 Rather, a court need
35'2 See Mohr, 653 N.E.2d at 1113.
353 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201-02.
354 See id. at 202 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965) and W PAtw.KEKrox
ET Al.., PROSSER	 KEKroN ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56 (5th ed. 1984)).
3" See id. at 201-02.
35" Cf. Catholic Charities, 588 N.E.2d at 363 (holding that because social worker's license
places him or her in position of trust, violation of that trust would constitute breach of fiduciary
relationship).
357 See Mohr, 653 N.E.2d at 1111.
September 19961	 WRONGFUL ADOPTION	 1015
only apply well-established common law principles to the adoption
context in recognizing a wrongful adoption claims`'"
C. Wrongful Adoption Claims and the Best Interests of the Children
Recognizing a claim for wrongful adoption is in the adoptee's best
interest because, ultimately, recovery allows an adoptee to obtain proper
treatment for his or her special needs. Wrongful adoption claims
ideally should also deter agencies from making misrepresentations,
resulting in appropriate placements where adoptive parents are fully
aware of their child's needs and can provide proper treatment right
away.'' Adoptees undoubtedly benefit from the recognition of wrong-
ful adoption claims, but courts imposing liability have questioned whether
wrongful adoption claims treat the children like products that come
with an implied warranty."" Rejecting this approach is essential to
protecting the interests of adoptees because it dehumanizes them and
belittles their needs and concerns. As one commentator put it, "a child
is not a used car, nor can a health impairment be equated with a faulty
carburetor."361 As long as the focus of wrongful adoption claims is the
inappropriate conduct by the adoption agency, and not merely detec-
tion of an adoptee's illness, however, there is little risk that courts will
need to undertake such an analysis."2
Another concern in recognizing the wrongful adoption claim is
whether imposing a duty to disclose upon adoption intermediaries will
negatively affect the placement of children with serious physical or
emotional problems." Although placement of special needs children
may be slightly more complicated and difficult than healthy children,
creating a duty to disclose would probably not create a class of un-
wanted adoptees who either are not as vigorously marketed or whose
problems are overstated for fear of liability. 3"^ Generally speaking, im-
posing a duty to disclose would result in the placement of children
with families who are aware of the adoptees' special needs and are
558 Id.
359 See Blair, supra note 191, at 879-80 (giving examples that show that sooner adoptive
parents know all relevant information surrounding child's medical condition, sooner treatment
can begin and child can progress toward better health).
:" See id. at 877.
361 1d. at 859.
scz See id. at 877.
363 See Chejfec, supra note 34, at 352
-53; Dickson, supra note 28, at 944.
364 See Note, When Love Is Not Enough: Toward a Unified Wrongful Adoption Tort, 105 HARV.
L. Rev. 1761, 1779 (1992). But see Chejfec, supra note 34, at 353 (stating that "mere possibility
that an infant has the slightest chance of manifesting an illness is enough to cause an otherwise
satisfactory adoption match to fail").
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capable of giving the children treatment and emotional support they
need.3"5
 This actually ensures that these children are properly placed
with a family that is receptive to and understanding of their special
needs.'" Rather than denying special needs children adoptive homes,
imposing a duty to disclose will actually encourage agencies to place
them with the many prospective parents who are willing to adopt a
special needs child:4'7
Whether disclosing an adoptee's medical history may result in
stigmatization and render that child unadoptable is a valid concern for
proponents of adoptees' interests. 3"8
 The high demand for healthy
infimts indicates that most people who enter the adoption process do
not wish to adopt a child with a physical or emotional disorder."
Studies have shown that of the children in foster care awaiting adop-
tion, sixty percent are special needs children. 37° Disclosing a special
needs child's background to prospective parents may be necessary, but
it does run the risk of stigmatizing that child as unadoptable both by
the agency and by the parents who reject the child."'
Moreover, as one commentator argues, the risk of stigmatization
extends to children who may not have disorders themselves but who
have a history of disease or other illnesses in their backgrounds. 372 For
example, if prospective parents learn that the biological mother of a
child is HIV positive, they may erroneously conclude that the child is
HIV positive.'" Similarly, a child could have tested positive for HIV
falsely.374
 Finally, disclosure of some information may cause prospective
parents to make unfair inferences about an adoptee. 375
 For example,
prospective parents may infer that because a child's biological parent
tested positive for HIV, the child has a predisposition towards drug
usage, promiscuity or homosexuality. 37" Thus, adoption agencies engag-
ing in a policy of truth may ironically help foster untruths about an
adoptee's true physical or emotional state.
3115 See Mohr, 653 N.E.2d at 1112; Catholic Charities, 588 N.E.2d at 365.
356 See Mohr, 653 N.E.2d at 1112; Catholic Charities, 588 N.E.2d at 365.
367 See Dickson, supra note 28, at 944, 940; Note, supra note 364, at 1779.
3614 See Chejfec, supra note 34, at 353.
" See Dickson, supra note 28, at 937 n.108,
37° Id. at 944.
371 See Chejfec, .supra note 34, at 353.
See id. at 359-60.
575 1d. at 360.
371 Id.
375 Id. at 359.
376 Chejfec, supra note 34, at 359.
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Although the concern over stigmatization of special needs chil-
dren exists, requiring that agencies disclose all relevant information
about an adoptee ultimately results in more successful adoptions of
special needs children. 1 S77
 The adoptive parents' fear that a child has
undisclosed problems is likely to be a much stronger deterrent to
special needs adoptions than an accurate appraisal of a child's actual
problems."' Furthermore, many people who seek to adopt are willing
to consider a child with a handicap. S 79 In fact, experts who specialize
in placing special needs children state that good adoptive homes are
available, but agency under-staffing and bureaucratic red tape often
hinder the placement process. 18" Finally, prospective parents may re-
ceive state and federal subsidies for adopting special needs children to
ease any increased financial burden."' In reality, then, there are a
number of factors which help ameliorate any negative effects resulting
from disclosure of an adoptee's background."2 These factors, com-
bined with competent, professional and efficient practices on the part
of the adoption intermediary, may be enough to eliminate many of the
problems which lead to wrongful adoption suits."' Specifically, disclo-
sure by intermediaries will likely strengthen the bond between adoptive
parents and a special needs child by ensuring that the parents under-
stand the child's needs and are willing to cater to them. 'H 4
CONCLUSION
In sum, the wrongful adoption claim is not only important to
correct the mistakes (intentional or negligent) made by adoption in-
termediaries during the adoption process, but it is also essential to the
success of the adoption process as a whole. Without the possibility of
being held liable for their misrepresentations, agencies will not be
deterred From making placements that jeopardize the well-being of
adopters and cause incredible distress to adoptive parents."' Imposing
upon adoption agencies a duty to disclose is also an essential part of
377 See Dickson, supra note 28, at 944-45.
378 Id. at 945.
979 Id. al 944 (citing study which showed that over 50% of adopters surveyed expressed
willingness to adopt child with major physical handicap). For example, there ate couples who
exclusively request to adopt HIV/AIDS children. Chejfec, ROM note 34, at 359 11.114. Some of
those couples return to adopt again even after their previous child has passed away. Id.
38(1 Blair, supra !tote 191. at 863-64.
381 Id. at 883,883 11.158; Note, supra note 364, at 1778.
"2 See Blair, supra note 191, at 883; Dickson, supra note 28, at 944.
383 See Blair, supra note 191, at 863.
:I 144 id. at 866.
385 See id. at 879,882.
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the adoption process because it forces agencies to disclose information
when they otherwise might avoid liability by simply withholding infor-
mation about an adoptee's background.386
 Without the recognition of
wrongful adoption claims, adoption is therefore an incomplete proc-
ess, with the potential for immense confusion and unexpected heart-
ache. These two emotions simply should not be a part of the joyful
experience of adopting a child.
THANDA A. FIELDS
386 See MaIlene v. Children's Friend Sc Serv., 661 A.2d 67, 73 (M. 1995); Mcraele v. Children's
Servs. Soc'y, 437 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Wis. 1989).
